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Abstract
This paper addresses the economic impact of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS)
for carbon on wholesale electricity prices in France and Germany during the Kyoto commitment period
(2008-2012). Specically, we rst identify a structural break occurred on the carbon spot price series on
October 2008, which is mainly resulting from the nancial and economic crisis. Then, we model the prices
of day-ahead electricity contracts. We look at the volatilities around their fundamentals and simultaneously
evaluate the correlation between electricity prices in both countries. We nd that the price of carbon does
not matter for electricity prices in either countries before October 2008. After October 2008, electricity
producers in both countries were constrained to include the carbon price in their cost functions. During that
period, French electricity producers were more constrained than their German counterparts. Comparing the
results with those reported in Kirat and Ahamada (2011) reveals improvements in the response of electricity-
generation sector to carbon constraints. The impact of carbon constraint increased signicantly by 300% and
150% in France and Germany, respectively, between the pilot phase and the second phase of the EU ETS.
This is a consequence of the possibility of "banking" for subsequent periods and the reduction of allowance
caps introduced in the second phase. We also nd evidence of a trade o¤ between gas and coal in electricity
generation in Germany. Furthermore, the conditional correlation of electricity prices in both countries is
highly signicant and greater than during the pilot phase of the EU ETS.
Résumé
Cet article traite de limpact économique du système communautaire déchange de quotas démission
(SCEQE), durant sa deuxième phase (2008-2012), sur les prix de gros de lélectricité en France et en Alle-
magne. Concrètement, nous identions un changement structurel survenu sur la série du prix spot du carbone
en Octobre 2008, qui est principalement dû à la crise économique et nancière. Ensuite, nous modélisons
les prix des contrats délectricité day-ahead et étudions leurs volatilités autour des fondamentaux tout en
évaluant la corrélation entre les marchés électriques des deux pays. Nous trouvons quavant Octobre 2008,
les producteurs délectricité des deux pays nont pas intégré le prix du carbone dans leurs fonctions de coûts.
Après Octobre 2008, les producteurs délectricité des deux pays ont été contraints dinclure le prix du carbone
dans leurs fonctions de coût. Pendant cette période, les producteurs français ont été plus contraints que leurs
homologues allemands. La comparaison de ces résultats avec ceux rapportés dans Kirat et Ahamada (2011)
montre une amélioration de la réponse du secteur de la production délectricité à la contrainte carbone.
Entre la phase pilote et la deuxième phase du SCEQE, limpact de la contrainte carbone a signicativement
augmenté de 300% et 150% en France et en Allemagne, respectivement. Cest la conséquence de la possibilité
de transférer des permis vers les périodes futures, dune part, et de la réduction des plafonds des allocations
introduit dans la deuxième phase, dautre part. Nous trouvons aussi des preuves dun arbitrage entre le gaz
et le charbon dans la production délectricité en Allemagne. Par ailleurs, la corrélation conditionnelle des
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prix de lélectricité des deux pays est très signicative et est supérieure à ce quelle était pendant la phase
pilote du SCEQE.
Keywords: Carbon Emission Trading, Multivariate GARCH models, Structural breaks, Energy prices.
JEL classication: C32 C51 Q49 Q58
1 Introduction
To implement the Kyoto Protocol, the European authorities established the European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU ETS). This is the worlds largest emissions permit market to date and covers almost
half of the European Unions total carbon dioxide emissions. It has been rst organized in two phases: Phase
1, from January 1st, 2005 to December 31th, 2007; and phase 2 ranging from January 1st, 2008 to December
31th, 2012. Phase 1 is considered as a pilot phase before phase 2, which coincides with the Kyoto protocols
rst commitment period. A third phase was formalized in January 2008 that will start in 2013 last until 2020.
The market is based on a cap and trademechanism. Market players receive free annual carbon-emission
permits at the beginning of the year. They then full their commitment by providing permits corresponding
to the tons of CO2 they have emitted by the end of the year. Those that have emitted more CO2 than their
allocation comply by buying more permits on the market. There is a penalty for noncompliance of 40e in
phase I and 100e in phase 2 for every ton of emitted CO2 for which rms do not surrender an allowance; in
addition, they have to surrender the missing allowances in the following year.
The pilot phase of the EU ETS was distinguished by restrictions on banking and borrowing CO2-emission
permits to or from phase 2. Pilot phase allowances could not be banked into the second phase and lost their
value if unused for compliance, making this phase a self-contained market that is not related to future
caps and political decisions regarding Kyoto. Conversely, banking from the second into latter phases is
permitted. Thus, the main contributions of the second phase of the EU ETS are the possibility of "banking"
for subsequent periods and the reduction of allowance caps. At European level, the allowances fell by 6:5%.
In Germany and France, the decrease reach nearly 10% and 15%, respectively.
The EU ETS is mainly concerned with energy1 and the major emitters of the industrial sector. It is
dominated by rms involved in electricity generation. Its main objective is to encourage the industrys biggest
emitters to reduce their carbon emissions and invest in clean technologies. Achieving this objective relies on
a real carbon price signal inducing electricity producers to make long-run choices to produce electricity with
fewer emissions. The price of electricity is determined by the cost of fossil fuels, the impact of environmental
policies, and climatic factors (such as temperature and rainfall). Economic theory suggests that the carbon
1Oil rening, electricity production, heating and gas transportation.
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price is a marginal cost and that the opportunity cost of the carbon permit equals its market price. As such,
the carbon price should be reected in the price of electricity. In this context, the ex-post empirical analysis
of the impact of the European market for CO2 permits on electricity markets is essential for the assessment
of the e¢ ciency and consequences of the EU ETS.
There has been a considerable work on the impact of the EU ETS, during its pilot phase, on electricity
prices in various European markets. Sijm et al. (2005, 2006) use OLS to determine the fraction of the
carbon price reected in electricity prices in Holland and Germany. Honkatukia et al. (2008) consider
the long- and short-run dynamics of electricity, gas and coal prices and the price of carbon permits in the
Finnish market using a VAR analysis. Bunn and Fezzi (2008) use a vector error correction model with
allowances, electricity and gas prices in the United Kingdom (UK), and daily temperatures in London and
seasonal dummies as exogenous variables. They carried out a structural analysis through imposing short-
run identifying restrictions based on auxiliary regressions. They nd that the UK gas price inuences the
allowance price, and that both gas and carbon prices help determine the electricity price. Kirat and Ahamada
(2011) study the impact of carbon trading on the French and German electricity markets together taking
the heterogeneity of national energy mixes into account. After identifying di¤erent sub-periods of the EU
ETS during its pilot phase, they estimate an empirical time-series model based on electricity-generation
cost functions including the cost of carbon. They model the prices of various electricity contracts in France
and Germany and look at the volatility of electricity prices around their fundamentals while evaluating
the correlation between electricity prices in the two countries. They nd that electricity producers in both
countries were constrained to include the carbon price in their cost functions during the rst two years
of the EU ETS. Over this period, German electricity producers were more constrained than their French
counterparts, and the inclusion of the carbon price in the electricity-generation cost function was much more
stable in Germany than in France. They also nd evidence of fuel switching in electricity generation in
Germany after the collapse of the carbon market. They claim that electricity prices in both countries were
more strongly correlated before than after the collapse of the carbon market during the pilot phase. They
conclude that the European market for emission allowances has greatly contributed to the partial alignment
of the wholesale price of electricity in France to that in Germany. Our major contribution is the study of
the impact of carbon trading on electricity prices with the EU ETS data for CO2 emissions during phase 2.
As an extension of the article by Kirat and Ahamada (2011), we examine whether and to what extent
the allowance price during the second phase of the EU ETS is included in the cost function of electricity
generation, taking the heterogeneity of national energy mixes into account. In particular, we focus on France
and Germany. We deal with the volatility of the electricity price around its fundamentals. We set up an
empirical model that species electricity prices as a function of a set of widely accepted prices drivers (fuel
prices, temperature, allowance price). The estimation methodology allows us to measure the instantaneous
correlation between the wholesale electricity prices across the two countries. We cover the second phase of
the EU ETS until December 2010 and take into account di¤erent sub-periods: before and after October 2008.
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This corresponds to a structural break occurred on the carbon spot price series, which is mainly resulting
from the nancial and economic crisis. We then compare the results with those of the rst phase of the
EU ETS reported by Kirat and Ahamada (2011) in order to evaluate improvements of phase 2: mainly, the
possibility of banking permits to future periods and the reduction of the cap representing the total amount
of allowances.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the functioning of the electricity sector. Section 3
presents a descriptive analysis of the data and describes the econometric modelling. Section 4 presents the
results and their interpretation, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The electricity-generation sector
The electricity sector received a large share of the Community CO2 permit allocation in both phases of
the European market. Despite this, it was the only sector with a net shortage of allowances during phase
I of the EU ETS, whereas all other sectors acted as net allowance suppliers. Before analyzing the impact
of carbon constraints, it is probably useful to describe how the sector is organized. There are four main
areas: production, transportation, distribution and marketing. There are also purely nancial activities
such as brokerage and trading (over the counter or on power exchanges). Electricity generation is the
main polluting activity and since 1998 has been opened up to competition in the process of liberalizing the
European electricity market. Electricity is produced from various primary energy sources: nuclear, coal,
oil, gas, hydropower, biomass, wind, solar and geothermal power. The share of each of these describes the
energy-source mix in electricity generation. This mix di¤ers sharply from one European country to another
due to di¤erences in energy policies and the particular geographical and geological features of each country.
For instance, while in Germany more than 50% of electricity is generated using coal and lignite, France
produces almost 80% of its electricity from nuclear energy, with fossil fuels accounting for just 9%. Knowing
that producing electricity from fossil fuel plants is more costly and emits more CO2 compared to nuclear
plants, one could expect that electricity and carbon prices relationships might di¤er in both countries.
Electricity di¤ers from other goods as it is not storable, which explains some of the particular charac-
teristics of the generation sector described below. There are considerable uctuations in electricity demand
from one hour, day and season to another. Continuous adaptation of electricity supply is thus required to
meet demand. The cost of electricity production di¤ers according to the primary energy source used, and
therefore so does protability. Consequently, electricity production is characterized by the sequential use of
production technologies depending on production costs. Producers start up power plants to meet demand, in
increasing order of their variable marginal costs of production. This is the concept of merit orderbetween
di¤erent technologies which is determined by the variable marginal cost of production (where variable costs
refer to fuel and operational costs). This merit order between technologies is not xed and depends on
carbon price. To that respect, the switching price was thus dened by Sijm et al. (2005) as the price of
5 
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carbon at which it becomes more protable for a producer to use a gas power plant rather than a coal plant.
The choice of power production plans does not depend only on the merit order, but also on technical
parameters such as the number of functioning hours necessary for the protability of a given type of plant,
the depreciation of xed capital invested in di¤erent plants, and the availability of the Kwh produced.2
The EU ETS stipulates that the percentage of reductions for each installation in a country is "grandfa-
thered". There is therefore an obligation to reduce annual CO2 emissions and thus, throughout the European
Union, a supply function of CO2-emission reduction (Bunn and Fezzi, 2008) reecting the increasing mar-
ginal costs of reducing emissions over a year. In the electricity-generation sector, this supply function reects
changes in the merit order curve between the primary energies. As these changes depend on the energy mixes
and existing installations in each country, the emissions supply function includes the lower costs of substi-
tuting lignite for coal in Germany, and the higher abatement costs of substituting gas for coal (Kirat and
Ahamada, 2011). Rightly, as electricity producers who emit more CO2 than their allowances will buy al-
lowances on the market to be in compliance, the carbon price should be added to the fuel and operational
costs of electricity generation. On the other hand, due to the free allocation of CO2-emission allowances to
participants at the beginning of the period and the emergence of a carbon price from the daily market, these
permits are a new liquid asset available to participants, creating an opportunity cost for emission permits
which equals their market price (Sijm et al., 2006).
3 Data and econometric modelling
3.1 Data and descriptive analysis of carbon and energy prices
We use electricity prices in e/MWh from the day-ahead base load3 contracts covering the French and
German markets and traded on EPEX Spot exchange.4 Day-ahead contracts are traded on a given day
for the delivery of electricity one day ahead. The data we use here are of weekday frequency and run from
March 3rd, 2008 to December 30th, 2010. Due to its liquidity, the carbon spot price comes from the Bluenext
environmental trading exchange expressed in e per ton. With respect to primary energy markets, we appeal
to the following price series expressed in e per MWh: i) the gas price of the month-ahead future contract
traded on the Zeebrugge hub; and ii) the coal price of the month-ahead future contract Coal CIF ARA.
The temperatures variables are calculated as the average temperatures recorded at representative regional
2Electricity producers make complex calculations of production costs of di¤erent technologies while ensuring that production
follows real-time demand. In peak periods, a number of production units are used, and as demand falls so does the number of
production units. This implies stopping and restarting units depending on demand. The operational features of the production
units (including start-up time, the levels of maximum and minimum production, and energy e¢ ciency) imply that power plants
may be used continuously or discontinuously.
3The electricity base-load price is the price on the block for 24 hours. This is an arithmetic average price over the 24 hours
of the day (from 0h to 23h).
4EPEX Spot exchange is a holding company created by the cooperation between EEX Power Spot and Powernext SA, the
German and French electricity stock exchanges, respectively.
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Figure 1: Day-ahead contract electricity prices in France and Germany.
weather stations, which are taken from the European Climate Assessment and Dataset.5 Our nal sample
consists of 724 observations, the main characteristics of which are described below.
Figures 1 and 2 show the French and German day-ahead electricity prices, as well as the prices of gas,
coal and carbon over the period from March 2008 until December 2010.
These gures show that day-ahead contract prices are very volatile. The price of coal uctuates within
a range of 5 to 20 e/MWh around an average of 10 e/MWh. The price of gas experiences two phases. The
rst covers 2008 and is characterized by signicant uctuations around an average of 25 e/MWh, including a
sharp increase in the second semester when gas prices rose from just above 27 e/MWh in August to around
37 e/MWh in October. The second phase covers 2009 and 2010, during which the price of gas uctuates
within a range of 10 to 20 e/MWh with an increasing trend towards the end of the period.
The spot price of carbon uctuated in the range of 20 to 30 e per ton from March 2008 until October
2008, peaking at over 28 e on July 1, 2008. From October 2008, the price of CO2 emissions fell below 20
e and declined to go below 8 e in February 2009. Then it rose again to hover around a range of 13 e - 14
e until December 2010. The sharp drop in carbon spot price from October 2008 gives a visual feeling of
signicant break in the carbon spot price series. Following Kirat and Ahamada (2011), we thus apply a unit-
root test with structural breaks to detect the break dates in carbon spot prices. We chose the unit-root test
5Klein Tank et al., "Daily dataset of 20th-century surface air temperature and precipitation series for the European Climate
Assessment", 2011, available at http://eca.knmi.nl.
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Figure 2: Carbon, gas and coal prices.
with a change in the mean pioneered by Perron and Vogelsang6 (1992), where the break date is endogenous.
There are two procedures, according to whether the series is detrended or not before performing the unit
root test. The procedure consisting in applying a lter before the test is called AO (Additive Outlier) and
captures sudden changes in the slope of the series. That which detrends and performs the test at the same
time is called IO (Innovational Outlier) and captures incremental changes in both the slope and the mean
of the series. The test ndings regarding the break date are summarized in Figure 3.
The test applied to the logarithm of the emission allowance spot price series suggests a structural break.
The IO procedure puts this at October 13th, 2008 while the AO procedure puts this at October 31st, 2008.
These break dates are very close thus demonstrating the relevance and robustness of the structural-break
date. The structural break corresponds to a sharp drop in the carbon spot price, which fell to below 15 e
per ton. The emission permit loses over a half of its value in less than ve months. This collapse in the
carbon spot price is due to a low demand of emission permits, which in turn can be attributed to several
factors. Firstly, the nancial crisis and the declining global equity prices followed by the economic crisis
caused a reduced economic activity of electricity producers and the major emitters of the industrial sector,
which was inevitably followed by a drop in real emissions. Emissions of greenhouse gases from European
Union businesses participating in the EU ETS fell by 11:6% in 2009 compared with 2008. Secondly, the low
6See the Appendices for more details on this test.
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Figure 3: Detection of structural-break dates.
level of gas prices throughout 2009 made it much more attractive to produce power from gas rather than
coal. Economic theory suggests that the price of carbon equals the marginal abatement cost. Assuming
that the predominant method of abatement is a shift in the generation dispatch order away from hard coal
towards gas (because the former is more than twice as emissions-intensive per unit of output than the latter)
we can easily understand that a drop in gas price lowers allowance demand and decreases the permit price.
3.2 The econometric modeling
We build on stylized facts by Kirat and Ahamada (2011) to estimate an empirical time-series model. These
facts argue that changes in electricity prices reect changes in the marginal cost of electricity-generation.
This includes the cost of the primary energy (gas or coal) used to produce the last unit, operating costs,
and carbon costs entering the production of that unit. Temperature is also crucial in determining day-ahead
electricity prices. The relationship between electricity demand and temperature is "V-shaped", as electricity
demand is higher at both lower and higher temperatures (Engle et al., 1986). To account for the nonlinearity
of the relationship between electricity price and temperature, we consider the temperature variable T and
its square T 2.
The econometric specication of the electricity price appeals to dynamic modeling as the price variables
are in general functions of expectations formed by agents from their past experiences and new information
9 
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that they acquire over time. Current period price expectations can then be written as follows:
E

P elect jZt

= g (Zt) (1)
where Zt represents the information currently available to the agents, such as the price of energy used in
electricity generation and past observations of the electricity price. More specically, we assume that the
price of electricity is based on several variables: its past values, the current prices of gas, coal and carbon
dioxide emissions, seasonal dummies seasoni, i = 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 (corresponding to the ve business days of the
week j, j = Monday, ..., Friday), and the temperature variables T and T 2. This yields the following equation:
P elect = 0 +
pX
i=1
iP
elec
t i + P
gas
t + P
coal
t + P
carbon
t (2)
+1Tt + 2T
2
t +
5X
j=2
 jseasonj + "t
where P yt is the logarithm of the price of commodity y in period t. The number of lags p of the dependent
variable will be determined for each country by minimizing the Akaike (AIC) or Bayesian (BIC) information
criterion. In order to consider the interdependence between the French and German electricity markets and
allow time varying conditional correlation matrix, we specify the following model with Dynamic Conditional
Correlation (Engle, 2002; Engle and Sheppard, 2001) DCCE(1,1) errors:8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
P
elec=fra
t = 
fra
0 + 
fraP
elec=fra
t 1 + 
fraP gast + 
fraP coalt + 
fraP carbont
+fra1 T
(fra)
t + 
fra
2 T
(fra)2
t +
P5
j=2  jseasonj + "
fra
t
P
elec=ger
t = 
ger
0 + 
gerP
elec=ger
t i + 
gerP gast + 
gerP coalt + 
gerP carbont
+ger1 T
(ger)
t + 
ger
2 T
(ger)2
t +
P5
j=2  jseasonj + "
ger
t
("frat ; "
ger
t )
0 j 
t  N(0; Ht) where 
t the available information at time t
(3)
The model DCCE(1; 1) is dened as:8>>><>>>:
Ht = DtRtDt
Dt = diag(
p
h11t;
p
h22t)
Rt = (diag Qt)
1=2 Qt (diag Qt)
 1=2
where the 2 2 symmetric positive denite matrix Qt is given by:
Qt = (1  1   2)Q+ 1ut 1uTt 1 + 2Qt 1
Here u is the matrix of standardized residuals, Q is the 2  2 unconditional variance matrix of ut,
and 1 and 2 are non-negative parameters satisfying 1 + 2 < 1. The DCC(1; 1) model is estimated in
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two steps.7 First, the conditional variance of electricity prices in France and Germany are estimated from a
GARCH(1; 1) and ARCH(1) specications, respectively, at the same time as the conditional-mean equation.
The standardized residuals are then used to model the correlation in an autoregressive manner to obtain the
time-varying conditional correlation matrix. The conditional variance-covariance matrix Ht is the product of
the diagonal matrix of the conditional standard deviation Dt with the conditional correlation matrix Rt and
the matrix Dt again. The Rt =
0@ 1 12t
21t 1
1A matrix reects the instantaneous conditional correlation
between day-ahead electricity contract prices on the French and German power exchanges. The estimation
results for these models are presented in Table 1 and Figure 5.
We do indeed estimate a long-run relationship between the electricity price and its fundamentals, based on
average correlations over the entire March 3rd 2008 to December 30th 2010 period. However, the structural
break in carbon spot prices, detected with the Perron-Vogelsang test using the IO and/or AO procedure,
may a¤ect the relationship between the price of carbon and that of electricity and its fundamentals. To see
whether this is the case, we test the stability of the whole estimated coe¢ cients using Chow test. We test
the equality of the estimated coe¢ cients for the periods before and after October 13th 2008, and then for
the periods before and after October 31st, 2008. The results of these stability tests suggest that: i) the long-
run relationship between the price of electricity, fossil-fuel prices and the carbon spot price is unstable over
the whole period; and ii) this relationship changed after October 2008 in both countries. We thus compare
estimated models of electricity prices over two sub-periods: before and after the structural break. Depending
on whether the break date considered is detected using the IO or AO tests, the estimation results include
four sub-periods: March 3rd 2008 to October 13th 2008, March 3rd 2008 to October 31st 2008, October 14th
2008 to December 30th 2010 and November 1st 2008 till December 30th 2010. The next section interprets
the results.
4 Results and interpretation
The results in table 1 refer to the estimated prices of German and French electricity day-ahead contracts,
both over the entire period from March 3rd 2008 to December 30th 2010 and in shorter sub-periods. Full-
period results are given in columns (2) and (7) to illustrate the non-relevancy of inference when omitting
nonlinearity. Sub-period results are given for two sets of sub-periods. Each set includes sub-periods in relation
with the structural break in the carbon spot price detected using IO and AO procedures, respectively. The
break dates and the estimation results over the sub-periods of both sets are very close. This proves the
robustness of our results.
Before going into the details of the results in table 1, it is worth considering their general aspects. Over
the sub-periods, all of the estimated coe¢ cients which are signicant at the 5% level have the expected sign.
The estimated coe¢ cients on log prices are interpreted as long-run elasticities, as the models reect long-
7See the Appendices for more details regarding model estimation.
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run relationships. The signicant estimated coe¢ cients on lagged electricity prices reect the dependence
between contemporary electricity prices and those in previous periods: this dependence comes from the
expectations of contemporary electricity prices held by agents in previous periods. We note that electricity
prices in both countries vary by day of the week; weekday prices are lower.
We rst focus on the sub-periods results and look at the conditional correlation between electricity
markets. Then, we discuss the impact of the EU ETS on the electricity-generation sector and compare the
results with those of the pilot phase reported in Kirat and Ahamada (2011).
4.1 Electricity-price estimation results over the sub-periods March 2008 - Oc-
tober 2008 and October 2008 - December 2010
Over the sub-period March 2008 - October 2008, the results suggest that temperatures do not a¤ect electricity
prices in Germany. On the contrary, the estimated coe¢ cients on T and T 2 show that milder temperatures
push the day-ahead contract price in France downwards, and that variations in temperatures towards extreme
values lead to higher prices. Over this sub-period, only the price of gas a¤ects electricity prices in the long-
run equilibrium. All else equal, a 1% higher gas price leads to a rise of 0:53% to 0:60% and 0:40% to 0:44% in
the French and German day-ahead prices, respectively. The elasticity of the electricity price relative to the
gas price is slightly higher for France than for Germany. The price of carbon does not matter for electricity
prices in both countries.
Over the sub-period October 2008 - December 2010, temperatures a¤ect electricity prices in both coun-
tries. Milder temperatures push electricity prices downwards, and variations in temperatures towards ex-
treme values lead to higher prices. Over this period, estimation results of the mean equations highlight
signicant di¤erences between countries in the way in which primary energies and carbon appear in the
electricity-generation cost function. In France, the price of gas, unlike that of coal, determines the price
of electricity: 1% higher gas prices result in 0:12% higher electricity prices. In contrast, in Germany, both
gas and coal prices determine the price of electricity: 1% higher gas prices result in 0:19% higher electricity
prices and 1% higher coal prices result in 0:09% lower electricity prices. The impact of gas price and coal
price on German electricity price are of opposite signs. This result is consistent with a trade-o¤ between
gas and coal in producing electricity in Germany. The elasticities of electricity prices relative to gas prices
are lower during this sub-period than over the previous. The price of carbon strongly a¤ects the price of
electricity in both countries. A rise of 1% in the emission-permit price results in 0:19% to 0:21% and 0:13%
to 0:14% higher French and German electricity prices, respectively.
The carbon spot price did help to determine electricity prices only over the sub-period after October 2008.
The elasticity of the electricity price relative to the carbon-allowance spot price is higher in France than in
Germany. This may seems counter-intuitive, given the national energy mixes of both countries. However,
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Table 1. Electricity Contract Price Estimation Results
Country Germany France
period Full period sub-periods (IO) sub-periods (AO) Full period sub-periods (IO) sub-periods (AO)
break date October 13, 2008 October 31, 2008 October 13, 2008 October 31, 2008
Before After Before After Before After Before After
break break break break break break break break
Mean equation
P elect 1 0.672*** 0.597*** 0.652*** 0.621*** 0.644*** 0.743*** 0.585*** 0.709*** 0.622*** 0.688***
(0.029) (0.098) (0.032) (0.098) (0.036) (0.026) (0.095) (0.031) (0.089) (0.032)
P gast 0.172*** 0.439*** 0.189*** 0.399*** 0.187*** 0.114*** 0.602*** 0.125*** 0.530*** 0.121***
(0.028) (0.112) (0.032) (0.115) (0.034) (0.028) (0.161) (0.032) (0.154) (0.032)
P coalt -0.067** -0.021 -0.094** -0.041 -0.086** -0.049 -0.005 -0.076 -0.032 -0.063
(0.033) (0.096) (0.041) (0.091) (0.041) (0.038) (0.102) (0.046) (0.093) (0.046)
P carbont 0.181*** 0.226* 0.139*** 0.142 0.129*** 0.188*** 0.191 0.216*** 0.128 0.193***
(0.032) (0.136) (0.043) (0.109) (0.043) (0.031) (0.132) (0.044) (0.101) (0.045)
T level -0.005*** -0.012 -0.005*** -0.007 -0.005*** -0.015*** -0.039*** -0.017*** -0.029** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.012) (0.003)
(T level)2 0.0001** 0.0004 0.0001** 0.0002 0.0001** 0.0004*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001** 0.0005***
(0.000) (0.0003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cons 0.606*** -0.174 0.801*** 0.163 0.847*** 0.538*** -0.314 0.628*** -0.034 0.759***
(0.059) (0.518) (0.103) (0.462) (0.121) (0.061) (0.501) (0.090) (0.442) (0.103)
season2 -0.128*** -0.074** -0.134*** -0.089*** -0.134*** 0.151*** -0.166*** -0.132*** -0.172*** -0.129***
season3 -0.103*** -0.119*** -0.094*** -0.135*** -0.094*** 0.149*** -0.173*** -0.127*** -0.183*** -0.122***
season4 -0.171*** -0.192*** -0.156*** -0.212*** -0.153*** 0.174*** -0.197*** -0.154*** -0.205*** -0.150***
season5 -0.308*** -0.315*** -0.301*** -0.346*** 0.297*** 0.303*** -0.343*** -0.282*** -0.357*** -0.278***
Conditional variance equation
cons 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.003 0.002*** 0.003 0.002***
ARCH 0.793*** 0.487** 0.877*** 0.448*** 0.877*** 0.227*** 0.104 0.249*** 0.102 0.245***
GARCH 0.557*** 0.580** 0.608*** 0.580** 0.628***
LL 501.72 107.54 409.06 118.36 401.59 604.54 137.54 486.01 150.87 477.94
Standard errors are in (); *, ** and *** refer respectively to the 10%, 5% and 1% signicance levels. IO
and AO refer to the procedure used in the Perron-Vogelsang test which determines the break dates and the
corresponding sub-periods
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Figure 4: Conditional variances of French and German electricity prices in the case of IO break in the carbon
spot price series
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Figure 5: Conditional correlation of French and German electricity prices in the case of IO break in the
carbon spot price series.
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Figure 6: Conditional variances of French and German electricity prices in the case of AO break in the
carbon spot price series.
the reduction of carbon allowances during the second phase of the EU ETS and the evidence of a trade-o¤
between gas and coal in electricity-generation in Germany helps to clarify the result. Since the abatement
method of choice in the electricity-generation sector is a production shift from coal to gas, German producers
have more opportunities to reduce their emissions than their French counterparts.
The estimates of the conditional variance equations over both sub-periods suggest that electricity price
variations in the German and French day-ahead contracts are volatile. Electricity price volatilities are higher
over the second sub-period compared with the rst sub-period. For each country, the sum of the ARCH
and/or GARCH coe¢ cients is greater over the second sub-period than over the rst one. Figures 4 and
6 show the conditional variances of electricity prices in France and Germany and are consistent with a
higher volatility over the second sub-period than over the rst sub-period. Over the second sub-period,
the sum of the ARCH and/or GARCH coe¢ cients are equal in France and Germany. So is the variance
of the electricity price around its fundamentals. The return to the long-run equilibrium path following a
deviation in the day-ahead contract price and reecting an over- or under-estimation of the price of carbon
by electricity producers, is as fast in Germany as in France.
Figures 5 and 7 depicts the dynamics of the conditional correlation between the prices of day-ahead
electricity contracts in France and Germany. These correlations are positive and highly signicant. It was
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Figure 7: Conditional correlation of French and German electricity prices in the case of AO break in the
carbon spot price series.
very volatile around a value of around 0:6 in the rst sub-period up to October 2008. Thereafter, it became
slightly less volatile and vary around a value of 0:55.
4.2 Discussion
Now, let us compare estimation results over the sub-period October 2008 - December 2010 (phase 2) with
those reported by Kirat and Ahamada (2011) concerning the period July 2005 - December 2006 (pilot phase).
The di¤erences reect mainly the impact of the possibility of "banking" carbon permits to subsequent periods
and the reduction of the allowance cap. The elasticity of the electricity price relative to the price of carbon
permit is higher over the second phase of the EU ETS than over the pilot phase in both countries. In France,
this elasticity has tripled between the two periods while it has been multiplied by 1:5 in Germany. However,
unlike the pilot phase of the EU ETS, German electricity producers were less constrained by the EU ETS
than their French counterparts. Electricity prices in both countries were much more strongly correlated
during the second phase of the EU ETS than over the pilot phase. The conditional correlation were dynamic
and varied over time in the second phase while it was constant in the pilot phase. During its pilot phase,
the carbon market allowed the French electricity producers to extract more prots from their productive
park. It was not the case during the second phase of the EU ETS, thanks to lower allocations in the national
allocation plans (NAPs).
Overall, the results here show that the European market for emission allowances did have an impact on
the power-generation sector in both countries. The conclusion regarding the impact of improvements to the
16 
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EU ETS during its second phase on the electricity-generation sectors can be summarized as follows: it is
possible to apply for the same abatement e¤ort to electricity producers of di¤erent European countries, even
with heterogeneous energy mixes, by merely adjusting the ceiling of carbon permits granted to each of them.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have estimated the relationship between electricity prices, the prices of primary energies
used in electricity generation and the price of carbon dioxide emission permits, in both France and Germany,
over the second phase of the EU ETS. We have shown that the impact of the carbon market during the
Kyoto commitment period on electricity-generation sector was felt in two phases. The rst covers the rst
ten months of the second phase of the EU ETS, during which the carbon constraint did not a¤ect electricity
producersdecisions; the second covers years 2009 and 2010 during which electricity producers included the
cost of carbon in their production cost function. We have also compared the results with those reported
in Kirat and Ahamada (2011) concerning the pilot phase of the EU ETS. This revealed improvements in
the responses of the electricity-generation sectors to carbon constraints. The impact of carbon price on
electricity prices increased by 300% and 150% in France and Germany, respectively. The introduction of
"banking" in the EU ETS and the reduction in the largesse granted by the national authorities of European
countries to their power-generation sectors during the pilot phase increased signicantly the e¢ ciency of the
EU ETS.
A APPENDICES
A.1 The Perron-Vogelsang test
The Perron-Vogelsang (1992) test with a change in the mean using the AO procedure implemented on a
series y is based on the estimation of the following equation:
yt = + DUt + eyt
Here DUt = 1 for t  Tb and 0 otherwise. Tb is the date of the structural break and will be identied by
the scan method. The noise from this equation is the dependent variable in the following equation:
eyt = kX
i=1
!iDTb;t i + gyt 1 + kX
i=1
igyt i + et
Here DTb;t = 1 for t = Tb + 1 and 0 otherwise. This equation is estimated for each date Tb to identify
the smallest t-statistic for the unit-root hypothesis, which is then compared with the values tabulated by
Perron Vogelsang. In addition, the same test applied to the yt series using the IO procedure is based on the
estimation of the following equation:
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yt = + DUt + 'DTb;t + yt 1 +
kX
i=1
iyt i + et
Testing the unit root hypothesis is equivalent to testing whether the coe¢ cient  is signicantly less than
1.
A.2 Two-step estimation of DCCE models
The estimation of the parameters of multivariate models is based on the maximum-likelihood method. With
Gaussian residuals, the likelihood function is:
LT =
TX
t=1
log f(yt j ; ; It 1)
Here f(yt j ; ; It 1) = jHtj 
1
2 g(H
  12
t (yt   t)), the density function of yt given the parameter vector 
and . We assume that (yt   t) N(0; IN ). Thus, the log-likelihood function is:
LT () =  1
2
TX
t=1

log jHtj+ (yt   t)0H 1t (yt   t)

The Gaussian likelihood provides a consistent quasi-likelihood estimator, even if the true density is not
Gaussian. In the case of a DCC model the log-likelihood consists of two parts. The rst depends on the
volatility parameters and the second on the parameters of the conditional correlations given the volatility
parameters. So, with Ht = DtRtDt we have:
LT () =  1
2
TX
t=1

log jDtRtDtj+ u0tR 1t ut

where ut = D
 1
t (yt t) and u0tR 1t ut = (yt t)0D 1t R 1t D 1t (yt t). With this notation, the log-likelihood
is:
LT () =  1
2
TX
t=1

log jDtRtDtj+ u0tR 1t ut

LT () =  1
2
TX
t=1
[2 log jDtj+ u0tut]| {z } 
1
2
TX
t=1

log jRtj+ u0tR 1t ut   u0tut

| {z }
Q1LT (

1) Q2LT (

1; 

2)
with 1 being the parameters of the conditional variance Dt and 

2 those of the conditional correlation Rt.
The log-likelihood function can then be written as follows:
LT () = Q1LT (

1) +Q2LT (

1; 

2)
The coe¢ cients (1; 

2) are estimated in two stages. In the rst stage we estimate 

1 = arg maxQ1LT (

1)
and in the second we estimate 2 = arg maxQ2LT (

1; 

2).
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